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Abstract
In Cameroon, only 1/3 of children progress to secondary education. This
paper estimates a sequential model of school attainment to investigate the
role played by family background and individual characteristics in keeping
children at school up to the end of secondary school. Using data of the 2001
Cameroon Household survey, we ﬁnd that while parental wealth has no effect
on the probability to enter primary school. It is however a good predictor
of completing primary and secondary education. The lack of schools supply
reduces school progression, particularly the lack of secondary schools hinders
primary school entry. Finally, we ﬁnd that male children are more likely to
stay at school up to the end of secondary education.
Keywords: Schooling; Sequential
I would like to thank Vincenzo Verardi, Philippe Van Kerm, Bertrand Verheyden and Mathias Kuepie for
useful discussions and comments.1 Introduction
Having some primary education has become less problematic while getting some secondary
education is still challenging in many developing countries. Indeed, in 2007, the gross school
enrolment rate in primary school is 97% in Sub-Sahara Africa, while the gross school enrol-
ment secondary school is only 33% in the same region. In Cameroon in particular , the gross
enrolment rate in primary school is 3 time higher than gross enrolment rate in secondary school
1. In this paper, we investigate the role played by family background and child characteristics
on school progression from primary school entry to the end of secondary education.
Economic theory suggests that the decision to keep a child at school up to a given level
should depend on costs and beneﬁts. Costs depend both on the opportunity cost of child’s
schooling time and on the direct costs of schooling. Beneﬁts include productivity improve-
ment and creation of future earnings opportunities. However the relative burden of costs and
particularly opportunity cost, for a given level of beneﬁts, depends on family’s characteristics.
For instance, poor versus non poor parents, credit constrained versus non constrained parents
(Basu, 1998, Baland & Robinson, 2000), allocate child’s time differently.
Most existing research on school attainment and family background effects have used
static framework and have focused on single educational-transition models (Willis & Rosen,
1979, Mare, 1980) or highest grade completed (Dreze & Kingdon, 2001, Birdsall, 1985,
Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 1997). Educational-transition models consider family background
characteristics as determinant of transition probability from one stage of education to another.
Models of highest grade attained/completed are ordinary least squared or ordered logit. The
main limitation of these studies is that they ignore "educational selectivity". A transition model
from secondary to post-secondary school does not account for previous transitions, say from
primary to secondary school. Models of the number of completed years of education feature
the same limitation. Further, they suppose that family factors play the same role at different
stages of education. Yet, schooling is a cumulative and sequencing/dynamic process. Family
factors may have different inﬂuence at different level of education.
This papers models school attainment as the outcome of four decisions taken sequentially
1In Cameroon, the gross enrolment rate in primary school is 110% and the gross enrolment rate in secondary
school is 37% .
1by the household. The ﬁrst is whether to let a child start primary education. The second
is made by households with children already in primary schools. Should they keep children
enrolled until they complete primary education. The third decision is whether to enroll primary
school graduates in secondary school. The fourth and last decision is whether to keep children
enrolled in secondary school until they complete secondary education. Children who enter
primary school have some primary education and children who enter secondary school have
some secondary education. This approach accounts explicitly for "educational selectivity" as
only primary school graduates can start secondary education (Cameron & Heckman, 1998). It
has been used recently by Sawada & Lokshin (2009) to study obstacle to school progression
in Pakistan and by Pal (2004) to study child schooling in Peru.
We use data provided by the 2001 Cameroon Household survey to estimate a sequential
model of school attainment. This 4 stages sequential probit model is estimated by simulated
maximum likelihood. This estimation approach allows some household and child characteris-
tics to affect differently different schooling decisions. The ﬁrst ﬁnding of the study emerges
from descriptive statistics. The retention rate in education is decreasing. Conditional on com-
pleting primary education, the probability of a child to enter secondary school is lower than
its unconditional probability to enter primary school. From the estimated model, we ﬁnd
four other striking results. First, parental wealth has not effect on primary school entry. It is
however a good predictor of completing primary and secondary education. When household
wealth increases, children have higher probability to complete primary education and to move
up to the end of secondary education. Second, children from agricultural households are less
likely to go through the schooling process. Even when they start their education process, their
probability to move to higher level of education is lower. Third, female children and in par-
ticular those with an irregular school progression rhythm, are less likely to complete primary
and secondary education. Conditional on primary school entry, they are also less likely to
move to higher level of education. Fourth, while the supply of primary and secondary school
respectively constitute barriers to primary and secondary school entry, the lack of secondary
schools has an additional negative effect on the likelihood to enter primary school.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe data and present the econometric
framework. Section 3 provides the main estimation results and their interpretation. In Section
4, we discuss the main hypothesis made in the paper and conclude.
22 Data and econometric framework
2.1 Data
We use data of the 2001 Living Standard Measurement Survey in Cameroon. The sample has
11,000 households. The data provide information on children’s current and past schooling
details and on a wide range of household level characteristics. From the data, we can identify
the level of education of each child in 2001.
The cameroonian education system consists of four stages: primary, secondary, post sec-
ondary and university. Primary school has 6 grades2, secondary school has 4 grades and post
secondary school has 3. Children enter primary school when they are about six years old.
Supposing no failure, children complete secondary education at the age of 16. Households
decide whether children will attend and complete primary education, next whether children
will attend and compete secondary education and the decisions on post secondary education
and on university follows. These last two decisions are not considered in this paper.
In the database, the probability of being in the last stage of the schooling decision tree
becomes strictly positive at the age of 15. We therefore focus on children aged 15 to 25 years.
The upper bound of 25 is chosen because some children started primary school with a delay3
or repeated grades throughout their educational process. For some children in this age group,
the decision taken by the households is not completely realized, it is right-censored. This is the
case, for instance, of a child who is still enrolled in secondary school and whose parents have
decided that s/he will complete secondary education. Following Sawada & Lokshin (2009),
the risk set for later stage decisions, which is the set of children available at that stage of the
decision, consists of children for whom current stage decision is not right-censored. In section
4.1, we check that our results are robust to this assumption.
There are 8,470 children belonging to 5,130 households in our sample. Table (2) shows
2There are actually two sub-systems of education in Cameroon. Differences between the two sub systems are
related to the language of tuition, program content and the number of grades in primary school. Primary school
has 7 grades in the English subsystem and only 6 in the French sub-system. To make children from the two sub
systems comparable, we follow the Cameroonian National Institute for Statistics and consider that the ﬁrst grade
of primary school in the English sub-system corresponds to nursery school. Thus overall, we consider primary
school has 6 six grades in the country.
3Late enrolment is investigated by Bommier & Lambert (2000) in Tanzania and by Psacharopoulos & Patrinos
(1997) in Peru
3descriptive statistics of variables used. More than half of children in the sample (54%) are
female.
Table(1)showssampleconditionalprobabilitiestomovefromonestageofeducationtothe
next one. The ﬁrst column is the average educational survival rate. The probability of entering
primary school is 85% and is higher than the conditional probability of completing primary
school and entering secondary school. This decreasing feature reveals the decreasing retention
rate that characterizes cameroonian education system (INS, 2001). The last column of the
table shows the sample size at each decision point. As expected, the number of observations
decreases as we move forward in the decision tree.
Table 1: Conditional probabilities for educational survival
Rate (%)
Total Male Female Sample size
Enter primary school 84,8 89,5 80,8 8470
Complete primary education 77,2 78,3 79,1 7186
Enter secondary school 76,2 77,6 75,9 5546
Complete secondary education 67,8 72,1 63,5 4256
Total is the average survival rate while male and female are gender speciﬁc survival rates.
2.2 Econometric framework
Four stages of education are considered in this paper. Accordingly the household takes four de-
cisions sequentially. We deﬁne Ds as the indicator variable corresponding to the decision taken
at the sth educational stage. The process of schooling decisions can be described as follows.
Children are born with no education. When they reach the schooling age (around 6 years old),
the household takes the ﬁrst decision: whether to educate or not. Children who enter the edu-
cation system will have at least some primary education. The uneducated do not enter primary
school and are characterized by D1 = 0. Next, the household decides whether children who
entered primary school will stay at school up to the end of primary education or not. Children
who have entered primary school but drop out before the end are represented by D1 = 1 and
D2 = 0. The household then decides whether primary school graduates will proceed to sec-
ondary school or not. Primary school graduates who quit the education system are represented
by D1 = 1;D2 = 1;D3 = 0. Finally, some primary school graduates who enter secondary
school do not complete secondary school education (D1 = 1;D2 = 1;D3 = 1;D4 = 0) while
4others do (D1 = 1;D2 = 1;D3 = 1;D4 = 1). Children who complete secondary education
get the secondary school certiﬁcate and can proceed to post secondary school4. The four de-
cisions thus generate ﬁve possible outcomes than can be ranked in ascending order. We label
these outcomes by O1 to O5 as shown in ﬁgure (1).
Figure 1: The sequential schooling decision tree
The outcomes are labelled O1 to O5. Children in the group O1 have 0 year of education. They have never entered primary school. Children in the group O2 have some primary education
but have not completed primary education. Children in group O3 are primary graduates who have no secondary education. Children in group O4 have some secondary education but have
not completed secondary education. Children in group O5 are secondary school graduates.
We deﬁne the following index functions associated to the four decisions:
D
is = Xiss + uis, Dis = 1 if D
is > 0
Dis = 0 if D
is  0
where index s= 1, 2, 3, 4 represents the decision and index i represents that child. The sets
of covariates xs include the child’s and household’s characteristics and also the distance to the
nearest school. The vectors xs are allowed to be different for different values of s. The terms
us represent random unobserved variables and s are vectors of parameter to be estimated.
4This level of education is not considered here.
5If we assume that household decision-making is independent across stage, or equivalently
that uis are independent for all i and across s, then the sets of parameters s will be estimated
using four different simple discrete choice models. This possibility is however unrealistic.
Education is a cumulative process. Success or failure in one stage of education may shape
the decision made by the household at the next stage. Thus uis are correlated across stages.
Ignoring this correlation can create biases due to the selection rules at each stage.
We denote the joint probability density function of the error term by f(ui1;ui2;ui3;ui4).
The probability to complete secondary education is deﬁned by:











The probability of being in an earlier stages of education can be deﬁned similarly. It is an
integral of lower dimension.
Schooling decisions are interlinked across stages and are subjected to selectivity. After the
ﬁrst decision, subsequent ones are relevant only for a selected group of children. The number
of children is reduced for the last decision. If we denote by nj the number of children with
outcome Oj (j=1,...,5) and by Ns the number of children available at stage s (s=1,...,4), we
have that: N4 = n4 +n5 and Ns = ns +Ns+1 for s < 4. The decision to enter primary school
is taken for all children so that the total sample size is N = N1.






where 1Oij is an indicator variable. It takes the value 1 (1Oij = 1) if the outcome of child i
is Oj. The probability P(Oij) is an integral of dimension j, j= 1,2,3,4.
Computing directly these integrals is numerically difﬁcult. The likelihood maximization
procedure is complex because integrals must be evaluated at each step of the maximization
process. To simplify the computation procedure5, we assume that the joint distribution of the
four unobservable variables is multivariate normal and uses a simulated maximum likelihood
5There are alternative computing methods: (1)imposing a random effect variance component model with
6approach. Multidimensional integrals are estimated by simulation and substituted in the log-
likelihood function, which is then maximized with respect to the parameters of the model6.
This approach is less computer intensive and straightforward. It has been emphasized recently
by Cappellari & Jenkins (2006) for STATA users and its computing effectiveness is discussed
in Waelbroeck (2005).
We therefore assume that (ui1;ui2;ui3;ui4)0  N(0;) with
 =
0
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The diagonal elements of variance matrix  is a unity matrix. The model describe by
equation (2) is numerically identiﬁed (GAO et al., 2001). The supply of schools which is
stage speciﬁc reinforces the identiﬁcation of the model. The probabilities of the outcomes are
deﬁned by:
P(Oi1) = ( Xi11)
P(Oi2) = 2(Xi11; Xi22 j 2)
P(Oi3) = 3(Xi11;Xi22; Xi33 j 3) (4)
P(Oi4) = 4(Xi11;Xi22;Xi33; Xi33 j 4)
P(Oi4) = 4(Xi11;Xi22;Xi33;Xi33 j )
where  is the cumulative univariate normal density and k are kth multivariate normal
densities (k=2,3,4). The matrixes k, (k=2,3,4), are sub matrix of  where the term are multi-
plied by appropriate weights7.
up to four replications (Lillard & Willis, 1994, Pal, 2004); (2) imposing a common factor error structure and
approximating non-parametrically the joint distribution by a step function (Cameron & Heckman, 1998); (3)
using the "Full Information Maximum Likelihood", based on the Gauss-Hermite quadrature, and representing the
joint distribution of the four unobservable variables as a weighted sum of the products of univariate distributions
(Sawada & Lokshin, 2009)
6The multivariate normal probabilities are calculated with the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth
recursive simulator that is more accurate (Greene, 2003).
7The terms of matrix k are deﬁned by kij = ij  (2Yi   1)  (2Yk   1).
7This model is not linear and estimated parameters can not be interpreted as marginal ef-
fects. However marginal effects and estimated parameters have the same sign.
2.3 Variables
We are interested in the effects of child and household characteristics on a set of decisions
taken sequentially. Table (2) summarizes the descriptive statistics of all control variables used
in the sequential model described in section (2.2).
Child characteristics include the gender, age and the relationship to household’s head. The
gender is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for male and 0 for female. It indicates that
the share of male children is smaller at primary school entry and is increasing throughout the
decision tree. By the end of secondary school, the sample is split equally among male and
female children. The average age in the sample is 20.5 with a standard deviation of 3. Due
to their age, some children are less likely to be at a given decision point. For example, only
22% of children aged 15 reach the fourth decision point while 47% of children aged 20 are
considered for the decision to complete secondary school. This suggests the presence of age
effects in the decision process. We include 4 age groups represented by a set of 4 dummy
variables. The nodes used are the ﬁrst three quartiles of the sample distribution age, namely
18, 20 and 23. The last child speciﬁc characteristic is whether the child is the son or the
daughter of the household’s head. Many studies have suggested that the type of relationship
with household’s head affects schooling decisions8. About 40% of the sample is made of sons
or daughters of the head of the household were they live.
The set of household characteristics includes the level of education household head and the
occupation of the household head or of his/her spouse. Four levels of parental education are
considered. They are measured with 4 dummy variables: No education, primary, secondary
and university. Twenty four percent of children are from household where the head has no
education. Regarding occupation, we distinguish whether the main source of household’s
income is from wage or from self-employment. The variable included takes the value 1 if the
head of the household is self-employed and 0 if s/he is a wage worker. We also distinguish if
s/he is self-employed in agriculture or if s/he runs a business. While these variables indicate
8Case et al. (2004) and somehow Fafchamps & Wahba (2006) are two examples.
8the social group, they also characterize the sources of household’s income. Most wage workers
are civil servants whose income is more stable compared to self-employed.
The set of household characteristics also includes an indicator of household’s wealth. The
wealth proxy is the predicted value of expenditure par capita. This variable reﬂects the perma-
nent component of household living standard. Finally, the households size is included in the
form of number of household member per age group. We consider separately the number of
females and males of children in the age range of our sample9
The last set of variables contains details on school supply. Availability of primary and
secondaryschoolareconsideredseparately. Alsothesupplyofpublicschoolwithlowerschool
fees and private schools with higher school fees. On average, a public primary school is
situated within 1.1 km to each child and a public secondary school is situated within 4 km.
Private school are situated further away. The last variable indicates whether the household
lives in a rural area or not. The dummy variable takes the value 1 if the household is in the
rural area.
9The household size may be considered as endogenous in a household decision model(Baland & Robinson,
2000).
93 Estimation results of the sequential schooling decision model
Table(3)summarizestheresultsoftheestimated4-stagesequentialschoolingdecisionsmodel.
This estimates are derived from the simulated maximum likelihood estimation of the model
described by Eqs. (2) and (4). The last row of the table shows a test of the hypothesis that
the matrix  deﬁned by Eq. (3) is an identity matrix. We reject the null hypothesis and
conclude that household decision-making is indeed related across the four stages considered.
Ignoring the correlation structure of the unobserved error terms would give rise to inconsistent
estimates10.
Gender: The gender coefﬁcient is positive and signiﬁcant at all stages of education. Male
children are more likely to go through the four levels of education. However the gender dif-
ference seems to be age-grade speciﬁc. Table (4) suggests that there is no gender difference
among children aged 15 to 17 who have completed primary education. This is consistent with
the fact that the gender difference is not really important among children with a regular school
progression rhythm(TENIKUE, 2010).
The wealth indicator: The coefﬁcient on the wealth indicator it not signiﬁcant at primary
school entry. It is however positive and signiﬁcant for the 3 other decision points considered.
This result suggests that poor households can easily send their children to primary school, but
they encounter difﬁculties when it comes to keep children at school up to the end of primary
education or to move to secondary school. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of
increasing direct or indirect cost of education(Emerson & Souza, 2008). It provides a reason
why we may observe high gross primary school enrolment rate and lower gross secondary
school enrolment rate.
Parental education: Variables reﬂecting household’s head education have positive and
signiﬁcant coefﬁcients. This demonstrates the importance of parental education on the educa-
tion of children. Educated parents value education and are more able of perceiving its beneﬁts.
Parental education may also affect child’s motivation at school. The results show that, if the
household’s head has some primary education, it enhances the likelihood to enter and to com-
plete primary education but it has no effect on the probability of entering secondary school.
10Table (5) in appendix shows the results of the independent error terms speciﬁcation. This estimates are
believed to be biased.
10To affect signiﬁcantly the likelihood to complete secondary education, the household’s head
needs to have a university level.
Relatedness to household’s head: The variable measuring the relatedness of the child to
the household’s head is positive and signiﬁcant at all schooling stages. Being the son or the
daughter of the household’s head is important for education. This results is consistent with the
Hamilton’s Rule11 and has been observed in different parts of Africa (Case et al., 2004).
Occupation of the household’s head: The variable self-employment is not signiﬁcant
at any stage of education. Whether the household relies on wage income or not seems not
really important for schooling. However, when the main source of household income is self-
employed in agriculture, it constitutes a threat to schooling. When the household head or
her/hisspouseisself-employedinagriculture, itreducesthelikelihoodtoenterprimaryschool.
Moreover it affects negatively the probability to move toward higher educational levels. They
are two possible explanations for this negative correlation. First, agricultural households may
face higher opportunity cost of education due to the within household demand of child labor
(Bhalotra & Heady, 2003). Second, agricultural households may be more exposed to income
shock (Cogneau & Jedwab, 2008).
The supply of schools: The supply of primary and secondary schools have a signiﬁcant
effect on primary and secondary education. The further the distance to the school, the lower
the likelihood to enter or to complete the corresponding schooling stage. The results show that
the absence of a public secondary school in the village reduces the incentive to send children in
primary school. This is meaningful in an environment where private return to education might
be ﬂat for children with some primary education and increases as children start secondary
education (KUEPIE et al., 2006).
4 Discussion and conclusion
4.1 Discussion
Following Sawada & Lokshin (2009) we exclude children with right-censored realization of
schooling decisions from our sample. Excluded observations are typically children aged 15 to
11The theory that the closeness of biological ties governs altruistic behavior.
1125 enrolled in secondary school (15%). Taking explicitly right-censored into account requires
to add one more equation to our econometric model. Under this possibility, the model becomes
difﬁcult to handle numerically. As a robustness check, we include these children in the sample
under three alternative assumptions. The ﬁrst is that all children still enrolled in secondary
school will not complete secondary education. The second is that all children still enrolled
in secondary school will complete secondary education. The third and last is that only 68%
(the sample retention rate) of them will complete secondary education. We re-estimate the
sequential model under the three scenarios and our results remain qualitatively unchanged.
The ﬁve possible outcomes generated by the four decisions can be ranked in ascending or-
der. The ordered probit model can be seen as an alternative to the sequential probit model used
in this paper. Unfortunately, unlike the sequential model, the ordered probit model assumes
that a child can have secondary education with no primary education. Moreover, it assumes
that household and child characteristics play the same role on the likelihood to be in any stage
of education described.
Our data come from a cross section survey although schooling decisions are taken at dif-
ferent point in time. There are therefore some measurement problems as all our observations
relate to the year of the survey and not when the decisions were made. We assume that the val-




progression from primary school entry to the end of secondary education. It models school
attainment as the outcome of four decisions taken sequentially by the household. The ﬁrst is
whether to enroll a child in a primary school. The second decision is whether to keep children
enrolled until they complete primary education. The third is whether to enroll primary school
graduates in secondary schools. The fourth and last decision is whether to keep children
enrolled in secondary schools until they complete secondary education. The four decisions
are modeled with a 4 stages sequential probit model. This model accounts explicitly for the
"educational selectivity" and is estimated by a simulated maximum likelihood method.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding of this study emerges form descriptive statistics. The retention rate in
12education is decreasing. Conditional on completing primary education, the probability that a
child enters a secondary schools is lower than its unconditional probability to enter a primary
school. This is another facet of the difference observed in gross enrolment rate in primary
school and gross enrolment in secondary school.
From the estimated model, we ﬁnd four other striking results. First, parental wealth has
not effect on primary school entry. It is however a good predictor of completing primary and
secondary education. When households’ wealth increases, children have higher probability
to complete primary education and to move up to the end of secondary education. Second,
children from agricultural household are less likely to go through the schooling process. Even
when they start their education process, their probability to move to higher level of education
is lower. Third, the household’s head education reveals some threshold effect. While primary
education enhances the probability to enter primary school, having some university education
isneededtoenhancetheprobabilitytocompletesecondaryeducation. Fourth, whilethesupply
of primary and secondary schools constitute barriers to respectively primary and secondary
school entry, the lack of a secondary school has an additional negative effect on the likelihood
to enter primary school.
Our results are richer than most existing ones. They show how some schooling determi-
nants affect differently different levels of education. Policies to enhance education should then
consider some level speciﬁc interventions.
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16Table 3: Estimation results of the sequential schooling decision model
Primary Compl. primary Secondary Compl. secondary
Gender (Dummy = 1 if Male) 0.355 0.091 0.098 0.267
(6.31)*** (1.90)* (2.02)** (4.87)***
Dummy = 1 if age between 15 and 17 -0.308 -0.357 0.378
(5.77)*** (6.22)*** (4.00)***
Dummy = 1 if age between 18 and 20 0.297 0.211
(5.21)*** (3.57)***
Dummy = 1 if age between 21 and 22 0.584 0.122 0.152
(8.39)*** (2.39)** (2.94)***
Dummy = 1 if age between 23 and 25 0.457 0.212 0.239 0.088
(7.33)*** (4.46)*** (4.88)*** (1.54)
Son/daughter of the household head 0.681 0.394 0.607 0.322
(12.68)*** (7.61)*** (12.64)*** (4.13)***
Head has primary level 1.200 0.275 0.105 0.009
(24.09)*** (3.14)*** (1.22) (0.08)
Head has secondary level 1.911 0.912 1.004 0.168
(26.05)*** (8.15)*** (10.02)*** (1.07)
Head has university level 1.858 1.056 0.987 0.743
(12.75)*** (7.46)*** (7.74)*** (4.28)***
Head or spouse Non wage worker 0.007 -0.080 -0.047 -0.050
(0.12) (1.63) (0.95) (0.92)
Head or spouse Self-employed in agri -0.238 -0.356 -0.353 -0.288
(3.78)*** (6.05)*** (5.10)*** (2.74)***
Head or spouse Self-employed in business -0.052 -0.090 0.005 -0.067
(0.86) (1.79)* (0.09) (1.11)
Estimated expenditure per capita 0.013 0.068 0.093 0.069
(0.96) (6.84)*** (9.49)*** (5.22)***
Rural 0.152 0.041 -0.199 0.098
(2.05)** (0.62) (2.68)*** (1.05)
Distance to private primary school -0.029 -0.027
(5.79)*** (4.73)***
Distance to public primary school -0.048 -0.054
(4.85)*** (3.49)***
Distance to private secondary school 0.007 0.001 0.010 -0.011
(1.64) (0.15) (1.62) (1.69)*
Distance to public secondary school -0.029 -0.004 -0.027 -0.027
(5.38)*** (0.70) (4.27)*** (2.88)***
# of 0-9 years -0.111 -0.057 -0.035 -0.075
(7.47)*** (3.95)*** (2.26)** (4.31)***
# of male of 10-14 years -0.035 0.016 0.033 0.045
(1.12) (0.60) (1.17) (1.43)
# of female of 10-14 years 0.014 -0.017 0.035 0.132
(0.44) (0.64) (1.20) (4.03)***
# of male of 15-25 years 0.009 0.017 0.053 0.050
(0.42) (1.00) (3.05)*** (2.59)***
# of female of 15-25 years 0.063 0.099 0.126 0.094
(2.67)*** (4.96)*** (6.00)*** (3.77)***
# of male of 26-35 years -0.030 -0.013 -0.047 0.017
(0.82) (0.41) (1.52) (0.50)
# of female of 26-35 years 0.102 0.158 0.049 0.072
(2.59)*** (4.30)*** (1.23) (1.69)*
# of over 36 years 0.101 0.045 0.075 0.067
(4.16)*** (2.07)** (3.33)*** (2.53)**
Constant -0.376 -0.160 -1.007 -0.545
(3.53)*** (1.12) (6.14)*** (1.93)*
Number of observations 8470
Test: H0:  = I 2(6)= 47.7 p= 0.000
Primary corresponds to "have some primary education". Compl. stands for Complete. Secondary corresponds to "have some secondary education". Absolute value of z statistics in
parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
17Table 4: Estimation results: gender effect
Some primary Complete primary Some secondary Complete secondary
Age 15-17 * Female -0.247 -0.230 -0.002 -0.064
(3.20)*** (2.99)*** (0.02) (0.52)
Age 18-20 * Female -0.035 0.088 0.141 -0.390
(0.49) (1.29) (1.83)* (3.95)***
Age 21-22 * Female 0.212 0.299 0.263 -0.644
(2.59)*** (3.97)*** (3.01)*** (5.91)***
Age 23-25 * Female -0.006 0.295 0.254 -0.572
(0.08) (4.00)*** (3.04)*** (5.41)***
Age 18-20 * Male 0.280 0.215 0.280 -0.160
(3.60)*** (3.03)*** (3.46)*** (1.49)
Age 21-22 * Male 0.562 0.285 0.325 -0.385
(6.00)*** (3.48)*** (3.64)*** (3.41)***
Age 23-25 * Male 0.385 0.386 0.409 -0.292
(4.78)*** (5.25)*** (4.73)*** (2.52)**
Distance to private primary school -0.034 -0.032
(7.82)*** (5.51)***
Distance to public primary school -0.068 -0.083
(7.54)*** (6.04)***
Distance to private secondary school 0.003 -0.014 -0.012 -0.022
(0.71) (3.02)*** (2.10)** (3.05)***
Distance to public secondary school -0.049 -0.033 -0.055 -0.036
(12.40)*** (5.43)*** (6.93)*** (2.45)**
Constant 1.335 0.713 0.536 1.043
(21.63)*** (9.09)*** (4.47)*** (5.85)***
Number of observations 8470
The reference group to interpret the age/gender dummy variables is AGE 15-17 * Male. The model is non linear and coefﬁcients in this table are not marginal effects. The sign of the
coefﬁcient on the age/gender dummy variables gives the sign of the difference between the marginal of the variable and the marginal effect of being in the reference group. Primary
corresponds to "have some primary education". Compl. stands for Complete. Secondary corresponds to "have some secondary education". Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses. *
signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
18Table 5: Results under the assumption of independent error terms
Primary Comp. Primary Secondary Compl. Secondary
Sex (Male=1) 0.369 0.072 0.049 0.252
(6.57)*** (1.57) (0.95) (4.75)***
Dummy = 1 if age between 15 and 17 -0.302 -0.264 0.396
(5.80)*** (4.28)*** (5.09)***
Dummy = 1 if age between 18 and 20 0.298 0.228
(5.21)*** (3.97)***
Dummy = 1 if age between 21 and 22 0.588 0.102 0.098
(8.43)*** (2.06)** (1.77)*
Dummy = 1 if age between 23 and 25 0.461 0.191 0.179 0.093
(7.42)*** (4.06)*** (3.45)*** (1.64)
Son/daughter of the household head 0.643 0.363 0.502 0.332
(12.19)*** (8.30)*** (10.11)*** (6.31)***
Head has primary level 1.195 0.208 -0.157 -0.110
(23.97)*** (4.16)*** (2.45)** (1.41)
Head has secondary level 1.908 0.825 0.595 0.102
(26.15)*** (13.98)*** (8.48)*** (1.30)
Head has university level 1.859 0.959 0.567 0.697
(12.88)*** (9.00)*** (5.41)*** (6.19)***
Head or spouse Non wage worker 0.006 -0.084 -0.029 -0.069
(0.09) (1.71)* (0.55) (1.25)
Head or spouse Self-employed in agri -0.229 -0.344 -0.253 -0.331
(3.67)*** (5.89)*** (3.40)*** (3.54)***
Head or spouse Self-employed in business -0.042 -0.083 0.034 -0.065
(0.70) (1.65)* (0.58) (1.05)
Estimated expenditure per capita 0.010 0.069 0.080 0.068
(0.80) (7.08)*** (7.82)*** (6.69)***
Rural 0.128 0.030 -0.261 0.051
(1.74)* (0.46) (3.40)*** (0.55)
Distance to private primary school -0.029 -0.025
(5.80)*** (4.45)***
Distance to public primary school -0.050 -0.060
(5.19)*** (3.95)***
Distance to private secondary school 0.007 -0.000 0.016 -0.010
(1.62) (0.03) (2.59)*** (1.46)
Distance to public secondary school -0.027 -0.000 -0.022 -0.026
(5.08)*** (0.07) (3.11)*** (2.98)***
# of 0-9 years -0.116 -0.052 -0.002 -0.063
(7.97)*** (3.89)*** (0.14) (3.79)***
# of male of 15-25 years 0.004 0.021 0.058 0.061
(0.17) (1.24) (3.11)*** (3.17)***
# of female of 15-25 years 0.066 0.097 0.105 0.101
(2.81)*** (4.88)*** (4.64)*** (4.48)***
# of male of 26-35 years -0.031 -0.008 -0.050 0.014
(0.85) (0.27) (1.53) (0.42)
# of female of 26-35 years 0.111 0.152 -0.001 0.088
(2.77)*** (4.14)*** (0.03) (2.06)**
# of over 36 years 0.111 0.046 0.070 0.098
(4.62)*** (2.24)** (3.00)*** (3.84)***
Constant -0.372 -0.057 -0.276 -0.501
(3.49)*** (0.64) (2.71)*** (4.46)***
N 8470 7186 5546 4256
Primary corresponds to "have some primary education". Compl. stands for Complete. Secondary corresponds to "have some secondary education". Absolute value of z statistics in
parentheses. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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